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2Outline
• Research agenda and tools
• Platform competition model
• Demo and simulation results
3Research Agenda:
Architectural Strategy
• How is value created and captured in 
complex engineered systems?
• How can (should) (do) value-seeking 
agents shape their structure and 
evolution?
4Motivation
• June 2005
– Apple announces plans to transition Macintosh 
computers from PowerPC to Intel processors
• April 2006
– Apple introduces Boot Camp software that
enables Intel-based Macs to run Windows XP
5Old Game: Mac vs. PC
6New Game: Mac as PC
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8Two Kinds of Research Challenges
• Explanation
– Why did Apple make these design moves?
• Prediction
– What will they do next?
– How will their competitors respond?
– What patterns will emerge at the industry level?
9Why Is This Hard?
• Engineering tends to black-box “requirements”
• Economics tends to black-box “technologies”
– Need to integrate across levels of abstraction
• But people do it in practice
– Cases in point: Bill Gates, Scott McNealy
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• A formalism
– Design structure networks (DSNs)
• A modeling approach
– System design games (SDGs)
• Three models
– Palm and Handspring in PDAs (analytical)
– Value networks (computational / “closed”)
– Platform competition (computational / “open”)
Dissertation Work
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Dissertation Work
Today’s focus!
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A Model of Architectural Strategy in 
Platform Industries
• Platform: A system component (module) that is 
designed to be extended by applications
– Software examples: Windows, Java, Google Earth
– Examples from other engineering domains: NVIDIA nForce, 
Chrysler K-Car, Esplanade – Theatres on the Bay
– What about chemical, biomedical, nanotech?
• Platforms may be built on top of other platforms
(“application-level platforms”)
• Microsoft Outlook, Excel, Word
• MSN Messenger?  Skype?
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Basic Setup
• Systems are tree-structured; new products 
and categories build on existing platforms
• Agents (firms) arrive in sequence, make
a single product development decision
– Where in the architecture to build?
– How to attract applications and still make money?
• What fraction of downstream profit to extract through
architectural control?
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Main Contributions
• Industrial economics: extends game-theoretic 
modeling in a “history-friendly” way
– Network economics (Farrell & Saloner ’85, Katz & Shapiro ’94, …)
– Industry evolution (Bresnahan & Greenstein ’99, Malerba et al. ’99, …)
• Technology management: connects industry 
dynamics to individual incentives
– Platform competition (Baldwin & Clark ’00, Gawer & Cusumano ’02, …)
– Industry evolution (Abernathy & Utterback ’78, Tushman & Murmann ’98, …)
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Key Assumptions
• Firms are boundedly rational
– Learn by observing payoffs of prior entrants
– Choose action with highest expected payoff
• Subject to cognitive limits; can only evaluate a fixed
number of alternatives
• The future is uncertain
– Innovation (product category arrival) is stochastic
– Behavior of other firms also not fully predictable
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From Use Value to Payoffs
• Each product category has a use value
– Fixed at random upon arrival, then known to firms
– Firms with products in category receive equal shares
• Reduced form of a pricing game w/ differentiated goods
• Each platform owner chooses a “tax rate”
– May be direct (e.g., licensing fees) or indirect (e.g., 
advantage in complementary product development)
• Assumes platform owner can exclude application 
development through technical and/or legal means
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From Use Value to Payoffs, Cont’d.
• Each firm’s per-period payoff is its share of 
use value discounted by the tax rate of its 
parent platform
– GENERIC case: no appropriability, so tax rate = 0
– CLONABLE case: minimum of clones’ tax rates
• Intuition check!
– A firm’s payoff goes down over time as competitors 
enter its category, and up as complementors build
on its product platform
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Learning Algorithm
• Firms run linear regressions of prior 
entrants’ current NPV on characteristics of 
product location and tax choice
– Category depth, width, and value
– Parent tax, tax rate, tax^2, etc.
• Algorithm “seeded” by observations of 
prior runs (industry experience)
21
Questions for the Experiments
• Who makes the most money, and when?
• What is the optimal tax rate, and do firms 
learn to charge it?
• How does the level of taxation affect the 
“shape” of the system architecture?
22
Answers in a Nutshell
• Who makes the most money, and when?
– Generally top-level platforms (early in GENERIC case, later in 
others), but applications compensate through niche selection
• What is the optimal tax rate, and do firms 
learn to charge it?
– Declines by level from ~0.7 Æ 0.2.  Yes!  (But high variance)
• How does the level of taxation affect the 
“shape” of the system architecture?
– High taxes lead to shallow, “bushy” systems with few niches;
low taxes to deep systems with “vine-like” dependencies
23
Key Takeaways
• Top-level architectural positions are scarce;
it’s generally “good to be the king”
• But platform owners voluntarily limit their 
exercise of architectural control to attract 
application developers
• Cause to be (cautiously) optimistic that market 
forces can sustain open multi-product systems 
even when appropriability is strong
24
Demo / Eye Candy
• How am I doing on time?
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Summary
• Architectural strategy can and should be 
integrated with engineering design
• The resulting tools can help shed light on 
strategic moves like platform creation and 
the exercise of architectural control
• Computational models give dynamics for 
free – can study industry evolution in silico
33
Next Steps
• Platform model
– More focus on value migration over time
– Allow firms to develop multiple products
• Computational tools
– An exercise in platform creation …
• Explanation and prediction
– Engage directly with empirical evidence
34
Thank You!
• This paper and more at 
http://kuala.smu.edu.sg/~jason
• Or by email to
jwoodard@smu.edu.sg
